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SUPRANATIONALISM: A MODEL FOR MERCOSUR? EXPERIENCES FROM 





Abstract: The question that the paper tries to respond is: Can a supranational model be 
adopted by Mercosur? The paper starts with definitions about supranationalism, 
sovereignty and intergovernmentalism, analyzes the most common regional integration 
theories and the historical backgrounds of the European Union and Mercosur. In the last 
part the concept of key variables by Best (1997) is applied in order to conceptualize the 
complexities of regional integration and provides additional knowledge to the theoretical 
discussion. The conclusion is that the implementation of supranationalism does not seem 
appropriate because of South America‟s different historical background, its national 
institutions and traditional inclination to national sovereign rights. Further, it is argued that 
the Brazilians strong power position, its functional regionalism for its own purpose and the 
lack of credible commitment between the member states of Mercosur especially between 
Brazil and Argentina do not provide fertile ground for supranationalism. 
Keywords: Mercosur, sovereignty, intergovernmentalism, European Union, 
Supranationalism 
SUPRANACIONALIDADE: UM MODELO PARA MERCOSUL? EXPERIÊNCIAS 
DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA E A DEBATIDA ADEQUAÇÃO AO MERCOSUL 
Resumo: A questão que o trabalho trata é a seguinte: O Mercosul pode adotar um modelo 
supranacional? O trabalho começa com definições sobre supranacionalidade, soberania e 
intergovernamentalismo, analisa as teorias mais comuns na integração regional e o 
contexto histório de cada arranjo regional, da União Europeia e do Mercosul. Na última 
parte, o conceito das principais variáveis de Best (1997) é aplicado para conceitualizar a 
complexidade da integração regional e fornece conhecimento adicional para a discussão 
teórica. A conclusão é que a implementação da supranacionalidade não parece apropriada 
por causa do contexto histórico diferente da América do Sul, das instituições nacionais e as 
inclinações para direitos nacionais de soberania. Além disso, alega-se que a forte posição 
do poder do Brasil, o regionalismo funcional aplicado para os próprios benefícios e a falta 
de um compromisso credível entre os estados membros do Mercosul especialmente entre 
Brasil e Argentina não fornece solo fértil para a supranacionalidade. 
Palavras-chave: Mercosul, Soberania, Intergovernmentalismo, União Europeia, 
Supranacionalidade 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regional integration can assume different shapes in respect of its institutional 
design depending on its objectives. There is no generic formula how to mold the regional 
integration project as each region has its own cultural, historical, political and economic 
framework conditions challenging the integration process. However, leaders of regional 
integration projects have to show courage to find its proper way how to manage its 
obstacles and it can be useful to learn from the experiences of other regional integration 
arrangements. 
In respect of the debate whether the regional integration project Mercosur could 
adopt a supranational framework it has been done a lot of research. Many authors (BEST, 
2005; FONTES, 2000; FURLAN, 2010; GODOY, 2008; MOTTA; MARTINS; DA SILVA; 
CULPI, 2013) have been quite optimists in relation to the adoption of supranational 
structure in Mercosur. Furlan (2010) argues that the current institutional structure can 
impair the integration process because country specific divergences cannot be overcome as 
political determinants influence the decisions and actions of the party states (FONTES, 
2000). Kovacs (2011) on the other side reinforces the historical importance of the principle 
of national sovereignty in Latin America and the rejection of supranational institutions in 
Mercosur ab initio and the difficulty to change this positioning. 
There is still a need for a systematic methodological and theoretical analysis 
including some key variables as it has been elaborated by Best (1997). Best (1997) 
analyzed public-management capacities for regional integration and defined variables that 
mold the complexity of the implementation of the integration objectives. A systematic 
approach helps to understand the complexities in regional integration and facilitates policy-
making choices, but it is still in its infancy because the systematic monitoring of regional 
integration process is a relatively new activity (DE LOMBAERDE; PIETRANGELI; 
WEERATUNGE, 2008). De Lombaerde and Van Lagenhove (2005) point out that the 
choice of variables in the systematic approach should be driven principally by theory rather 
than by the availability of data (as the first criteria). Further, some variables have 
problematic relationships with regard to causal links between them and their direction as 
the relation between the scope of coverage of an integration agreement and its stability and 
the relation between the perspective of time of an agreement and its stability for example 
(BEST, 1997). Despite the critics of De Lombaerde and Van Lagenhove (2005) Best‟s key 
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variables may constitute an important pillar for the discussion of the regional integration 
process in Mercosur and the resulting debate about the future institutional framework of it, 
even though Best does not provide a method to connect the complexity variables with a 
specific institutional construct. This may be rather advantageous due to the fact that none 
(European) integration theory is entirely feasible for the Mercosur case and consequently 
the Best‟s complexity variables may induce new perspectives. The following comparative 
research pretends to analyze systematically the different integration systems applied in the 
European Union and the Mercosur, especially revealing the integration targets, strategies 
and the resulting institutional framework, comparing supranationalism in the European 
Union with intergovernmentalism in Mercosur. The first part introduces the concepts of 
supranationalism, sovereignty and intergovernmentalism. The second part describes the 
different regional integration concepts in the European Union and Mercosur and analyzes 
the experiences with supranationalism in the European integration process. Among the 
decelerated and partly deadlocked integration process in the Mercosur arises the question if 
supranationalism could be an exit for the today‟s challenges. This will be approached in the 
third part. Do the distinct cultural, historical and political aspects in the member countries 
of Mercosur impede the implementation of a supranational framework or can the EU 
institutional model be applied to another regional integration project, namely the 
Mercosur? It may hardly depend on the integration objectives of the Mercosur‟s member 
leaders and how deep they want the integration process to continue. 
 
2. Integration theories  
 
Theory is the most utilized instrument in regional integration and creates the basis 
of the development of regional governance structures. However, in most of the cases these 
theories are conceptualized for European integration and scholars as Schmitter (1991) and 
Malamud (2003b) doubt if any of these theories is capable to explain the Mercosur case. 
Nevertheless, they might be helpful in some aspects and be it for highlighting the 
differences between the European and Latin American integration projects and the 
governance structures.  
The two theories to formulate lessons with regard to Mercosur are the so-called 
neo-functionalism by Haas (1958, 1964) and the intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik 
(1998). Neo-functionalism emphasizes the role of non-state actors and social movements, 
Marketa Maria Jerabek  406 
BJIR, Marília, v. 5, n. 2, p., mai/ago. 2016 
providing the dynamic for further integration whereas member states remain important 
actors in the process. The integration is assumed to be a conflictual process where under 
democracy and pluralistic representation the member states resolve to form regional 
organizations (MALAMUD; SCHMITTER, 2006). As the citizens will shift their 
expectations to the region the economic-social integration will “spill-over” into political 
integration (HAAS, 1958, 1964). In the intergovernmentalism approach economic 
interdependence is the principal reason for integration (MORAVCSIK, 1998). The 
strongest pressures for trade liberalization are the export dependence and intra-industry 
trade, whereas intergovernmentalism does not explain additional steps for further 
integration. The approach does not deny challenges that may emerge with increased 
interdependences, but still the key decisions are made on intergovernmental level 
(MALAMUD, 2003a). Malamud (2003a) argues that neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism can be seen as contraries. Neo-functionalism emphasizes the 
interaction between integration and institutions whereas intergovernmentalism between 
interdependence and integration. In the Mercosur case none of these theories are enough 
feasible to explain the integration process. The interdependence-integration-institutions 
chronology could not be observed in Mercosur and interdependence was not a precondition 
for integration. Au contraire: integration itself brought an increased interdependence 
(MALAMUD, 2003b). In Argentina intra-regional trade increased from 1.5% in 1986 to 
5.1% in 1997, in Brazil from 0.9% (1986) to 2.4% (in 1997), Paraguay from 11.0% (1986) 
to 24.5% (1997) and in Uruguay from 12.5% in 1986 to 14.7% in 1997 (MALAMUD, 
2003b, p.62). 
 




As the European Union is the example of a supranational (and intergovernmental) 
organization the discussion about the definition of supranationalism follows some 
characteristics of the European Union for exemplary purpose. 
It is vague to define supranationalism as a complex of supranational institutions 
“with regional organs operating at a higher level” (BEST, 2005, p. 2). In general, 
supranationalism has to be seen as an organic complement to the state, a level within a 
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multi-level framework of governance. The case of the United States of America where 
there has been established a higher system of government with a division in competences 
represents an extreme case, a case of political unification. Best (2005) emphasizes that the 
effectiveness of supranational actions depends on the interdependence between actors in 
the multi-level system. Institutions cannot be defined only as physical organs. The 
definition of institution goes beyond this, as institutions represent values, rules and norms 
dominating a particular order. 
The adoption of supranationalism can occur in very different integration methods 
and does not mean the complete loss of national sovereignty. The concept involves some 
kind of limitation of sovereign rights depending on the common will of nation states how 
far they want to go with the supranational framework. 
According to Weiler (1981) European supranationalism has two characters: a 
normative (juridical approach) and decisional (political approach). Normative 
supranationalism has to do with the hierarchy and the relationships of EU policies and the 
competing policies of the member states. Laws and policies need to be interlinked in the 
EU member states what is stated by the normative supranationalism. Decisional 
supranationalism relates to the institutional and decision-making process in the Union by 
which the policies are debated, formulated and executed. 
Supranationalism in legal terms (normative supranationalism) means an approval of 
sovereign states to follow norms that are constructed at a higher level of organization 
(transfer sovereignty). In the European example this means that in existence of a conflict 
between a national law and Community law, the Community law will be applied (BEST, 
2005). But the Union disposes only of those powers that are being conferred by the 
member states. Therefore, the Union has no “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” capacity to change 
its own powers. “The member states maintain the central role in decision-making, in 
interaction with the Commission and Parliament “(BEST, 2005, p. 4). When EU member 
states accept the so called supremacy of Community law, they accept the direct effect 
principle what results in the creation of rights and obligations directly for citizens (BEST, 
2005). 
Best (2005) distinguishes firstly between the transfer of sovereignty rights and the 
transfer between sovereignty itself. In the first case there has been recognition of it in some 
national constitutions concerning the role of international organizations. In the Italian 
constitution from 1948, before the beginning of the European integration process, the 
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article 11 states that the Italian government agrees to limitations of sovereignty if it is 
necessary to ensure peace and justice among nations. The limitations of sovereignty rights 
can therefore occur only on a certain level when the nation state agrees with it. Factually, it 
is not an abandonment of sovereignty, but it a transfer of the exercise of power. It is 
therefore very essential to explain what supranationalism actually means as there is a 
difference between sharing sovereignty between countries and the drop of sovereignty to a 
higher level above the countries dominions (BEST, 2005). 
The second distinction that Best (2005) makes is concerning the competences 
involved. The Article 2 paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) defines that the Union has exclusive competence in a specific area when it 
is declared so in the treaties and that the members can legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts, only if they were empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.
3
 
The European Union has in terms of competences only few areas in which the Community 
has exclusive competences, as in the following areas: customs union, the establishing of 
the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, monetary policy 
for the member states whose currency is the euro, the conservation of marine biological 
resources under the common fisheries policy and common commercial policy. 
In relation to shared competences (article 2 paragraph 2 of the TFEU) between the 
Union and the member states, the Union and the members may legislate and adopt acts. 
The member states exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised 
its competence. Sharing competences between the Union and the member states are 
applied in: internal market, social policy, economic and social cohesion, agriculture, 
environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, area of 
freedom, security and justice, common safety concerns in public health matters.
4
 
The adoption of EU rules is not based on the transfer of decision-making power to a 
higher level of the Union, but the elected or autonomous authorities interact between the 
Union institutions and the national governments. 
In the political approach (decisional supranationalism), supranationalism may be 
applied in the decision-making process or the enforcement. The first kind of supranational 
arrangement can be summarized as pooled sovereignty which occurs when governments 
make decisions which do not have unanimity or when governments agree to act 
                                                 
3
 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL&from=DE [29.11.2014]. 
4
 Article 3 and 4 of the «Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union» 
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collectively or not at all even if there is unanimity. The second kind of supranational 
arrangement relates to the delegation of powers to autonomous institutions. In the decision-
making process, autonomous power means the right to adopt normative decisions on the 
basis of the treaty, without the need for agreement by member states. 
On a theoretical basis Best (1997) rationalized a few key variables that are 
important to consider when debating about the adoption of supranationalism and its 
adequacy to the needs in regional integration arrangements (here are only listed these 
variables that are considered to be interrelated with the theoretical discussion in this 
paper): a) Number of member states, b) The relative sizes of the participating countries, c) 
Degree of real interdependence, d) The political framework, e) Perceptions, values and 
norms. 
In the third part about the discussion if a (partly) supranational system could be a 
future model for Mercosur, there will be a detailed debate about each mentioned factor. A 
regional system with supranational elements „may reduce transaction costs of future 
interactions simply by institutionalizing the integrative dynamic and negotiation procedure‟ 
(BEST, 2005, p. 12). Further, a supranational structure can be important for the creation of 
mutual confidence between members for the commitments that have to be fulfilled. As 
intergovernmental decision-making processes depend strongly on the relative power of the 
member states smaller countries interests are sometimes not taken into account. A 
supranational framework relaxes the asymmetries of power between smaller and larger 
countries. Alternatively can be argued, based on the liberal line of intergovernmentalism 
that the creation of communal institutions happens only in the interests of some specific 
member states of a regional agreement reinforcing the decision-making power of those 
state members (LOBO-FERNANDES, 2006). 
Another aspect in the regional integration is the importance of policy credibility 
towards governments, third countries, to markets and citizens, for which policy continuity 
is a necessary condition. Notwithstanding, it depends on the issue area and the degree of 
uncertainty in these issues as a supranational structure might be impedimental when there 
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The concept of sovereignty arose of the international system in the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 when sovereignty was related to the supremacy of each state‟s 
domestic institutions over its internal affairs. Giannini (2010) points out that the traditional 
concept of sovereignty eroded as states accept nowadays more limits on their freedom. 
Looking at the classical definition it reveals a weakness because it construes sovereignty in 
terms of independence. Historically one can see that there has never been absolute 
independence of states in international relations as the existence of another state‟s 
decisions always influenced the states behavior and strategic decisions (TYURINA, 2014). 
The Permanent Court of International Justice declared 1923 in the Wimbledon case that: 
The Court declines to see, in the conclusion of any treaty by which a state 
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a peculiar act, an 
abandonment of its sovereignty… the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty (PERMANENT COURT 




The Courts statement points to the two-sided character of sovereignty. Sovereignty 
as a term associated with supranationalism in the debates about the adoption of 
supranationalism in the regional integration needs to have some clarification about its 
definition as in international affairs and international law sovereignty is one of the most 
used and misused concepts. Sometimes it is used for the role of states in international 
organizations, sometimes it refers to the internal division of power and the degree of 
government authority toward the citizens (LEAL-ARCAS, 2006). 
One can break down sovereignty in three components as the sovereign, the territory 
or space and authority. Different empirical constellations lead to different sovereignty 
regimes (AGNEW, 2005). 
Haas (2003) defines sovereignty as following: 
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main 
characteristics: First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political 
authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its 
territory. Second it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. 
Third, it can make its foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is 
recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to 
freedom from external intervention. These components of sovereignty 
were never absolute, but together they offered a predictable foundation of 
world order. What is significant today is that each of these components - 
internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-intervention 
– is being challenged in unprecedented ways. 
                                                 
5
 Permanent Court of International Justice, Wimbledon case, Series A, no. 1, 25. http://www.icj-
cij.org/pcij/series-a.php?p1=9&p2=1 [29.11.2014] 
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In relation to a supranational organization it is often assumed that it is accompanied 
by a loss of sovereignty. Considering the legal fact that a supranational organization bases 
on an international treaty in which states agree to empower one of its organs for the 
purpose of the realization of common rules, it is wrong to conclude that supranationalism 
means a restriction of sovereignty when one considers that supranationalism is a derivative 
from sovereign wills (TYURINA, 2014). 
According to Best (2005) each regional system needs to provide capacity to provide 
solutions for problems that are likely to occur during the pursue of the regional integration 
ambitions and the methods of problem-solving must be suitable to social, historical and 
cultural aspects within the region and between the members involved in the process. How 
much sovereignty national governments cede and in which kind of areas depends on the 
regional agreement. 
At least but not less important is the analysis of the definition of sovereignty. 
Authors as Weber and Biersteker (1996) and Biersteker (2002) bring to mind that 
sovereignty is a social construct which succumb to transformation. In the context of 
treaties of Westphalia the sovereign was a monarch, while during democratization waves in 
many countries the sovereign became an elected person in a state. When we develop 
further we can think of popular sovereignty, of an authority that includes also non-state 
players as the civil society and non-governmental organizations. The state centric and 
nationalist approach of sovereignty has to be rethought considering the social construction 
of the definition of the sovereignty (LEGLER, 2013). Thus, the three aforementioned 
components of sovereignty, the sovereign, the territory or space and the authority, can be 




Due to the intergovernmental institutional character of Mercosur the discussion 
about intergovernmentalism is accompanied by examples from Mercosur to emphasis 
certain characteristics of this institutional form. Ventura (1996) explains the main 
difference between intergovernmental and supranational organisms as follows: 
In the first ones, it is about forums destined to collate individual interests 
and, if it‟s the case, to harmonize them. They are markedly negotiating 
scopes, whose decisions, if they exist, will be applied on the initiative of 
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member states. Supranational organisms suppose a negotiation on a 
different level for the definition of collective interests, through a proper 
decision-making process, at the service of a functioning independent 
structure‟ (VENTURA, 1996, p. 29). 
 
The intergovernmental model adopted in Mercosur roots in the classical concepts of 
sovereignty of the public international law. In intergovernmental entities individual 
interests of governments are debated and negotiated among governments whereas in 
supranational organism the negotiations happen on a different level where the main 
purpose is the definition of collective interests. Under intergovernmental circumstances 
states are free to cooperate or not and can define the level or cooperation whereas this is 
ensured normally trough a veto where a state can block any proposal presented by any 
member state (NUGENT, 2003) and unanimity in every case is required (MALAMUD, 
2003b). The intergovernmental form can be understood as an intermediary between the 
traditional concept of sovereignty
6
 and the supranationality. In Brazilian domestic law for 
example the norms of Mercosur are part of the same hierarchy as international treaties 
which need an approval in the National Congress as Mercosur does not have any direct 
effect law. In general, these norms have to be internalized by all Mercosur member states 
to produce juridical effects (MOI, 2004). In the European Union no structure is perfectly 
intergovernmental or supranational depending on the institutions and the situations 
(NUGENT, 2003). The European Union developed a complex structure of multilevel 
governance, with supranational and intergovernmental structures, majority rule and 
unanimity, subsidiarity and the supremacy of community law (SCHMITTER, 1996) and 
shows an institutionalized and increasingly bureaucratized structure (MALAMUD, 2003b). 
In the Mercosur case the institutional structure of intergovernmentalism was built with the 
goal of making the integration and the development of the institutional structure more 
flexible and gradual which means that organizations were created only when required 
during the integration process (PEÑA, ROZEMBERG, 2005). Any change towards 
supranationalism in this preliminary phase could have a negative impact on national 
macroeconomic stabilization objectives (ALMEIDA, 2002). Even if the intergovernmental 
structure has been a well-functioning construct at the beginning of the transition, Moi 
(2004) questions its adequacy at the actual stage of Mercosur‟s integration process. In 
general, regional institutions deal with the dilemmas of collective actions as decision-
                                                 
6
 that has its origins in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as discussed in the previous chapter 
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making processes and the resolution of controversies. However, Mercosur has not created 
any significant institutional structure (supranational or not) with no direct effect law. These 
characteristics are part of the project in order to differentiate between the political direction 
and bureaucratic directions. The decision-making organizations are composed of three 
regional bodies with appointed technicians with little responsibilities or member state‟s 
public officials and a secretariat in Montevideo (MALAMUD, 2003b).  
Contrary to many scholars postulating the necessity of supranational institutions, 
Malamud (2003b) however argues that the progress in integration has been possible 
because of the existence of one national institution, namely presidentialism, being less 
visible than supranational institutions (MALAMUD, 2003b). As argued by Peña (1996) 
even when the next stages in regional integration may be accompanied by a decrease of the 
presidential importance one can conclude that without the presidential actions there would 
not have been the initial stimulus nor solutions for important crises would have been 
achieved. Mercosur might have established a “new regional animal” (O‟Donnell, 1994). 




The institutional characteristics of South American presidentialism as the degree of 
legislative power given to the presidents (MAINWARING; SHUGART, 1997), when 
compared to the American presidential system, and the possibility to rule without 
parliamentarian interference highlight the essential role of presidents in the integration 
project process. The power of the presidents to exert a decisive influence in the 
decentralized bargaining process constitutes an important feature of Mercosur 
(MALAMUD, 2003b). Malamud (2003b) explains that the lack of overlapping cleavages 
in the South American compared to European region favors presidential power. “Instead, 
the axis Argentina-Brazil catches all the attention while in the European Union this is 






Marketa Maria Jerabek  414 
BJIR, Marília, v. 5, n. 2, p., mai/ago. 2016 
countries, the Nordic and the Southern, the supranational and the intergovernmental, and 
the like” (MALAMUD, 2003b, p. 67). Thus, as Hirst (1995) proposed, 
intergovernmentalism or as called by Malamud (2003b) “inter-presidentialism” should be 
maintained in the short and medium run and the future of the integration process might 
depend on the capacity to negotiate differences instead of identifying common interests.  
4. Regional integration concepts: historical, social, cultural, political and 
economic aspects 
 
4.1. The case of European Union 
 
The European case has already been described partly in the definition part about 
supranationalism but here we will discuss the European case in more detail. 
The main sources of modern European conflict can be found in the historical 
rivalries between France and Germany. After the Second World War France and the United 
States started discussions about the management of international conflict, especially 
dealing with the German question. France was weak after the World War and was anxious 
that Germany could recover fast and surpass its own performance. There were actually two 
aims involved in the integration process. On the one hand there was the aim of 
modernization of the French economy through liberalizing Europe and on the other hand 
there was the aim of a German peace settlement. The Americans from their side launched 
the Marshall Plan. In respect of the international politics, the growing Soviet threat 
pressured Germany for rearmament which has been seen with critical eyes by the French 
government. France would only accept the new developments in Germany with a broader 
arrangement of providing guarantees (BEST, 2005). 
The Europeans desire of a peaceful European region and the necessity of a better 
inclusion in the international economic competition can be seen as the main engine for a 
European regional integration. After the military alliance in 1948 followed the Treaty of 
Paris from 1951 which established the first European Community including Germany, 
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Luxemburg. The beginning of a supranational 
character of the European integration process could already be conjectured in the 
institutional framework of the established European Community of Coal and Steel. In 
search of further integration were established in 1957 two Communities, the European 
Economic Community and the Euratom, the Community of European Nuclear Energy. The 
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aim of the establishment of an Economic Monetary Union in 1997 completed the Single 
European act of 1986 that improved the internal market (GODOY, 2008). Araújo (2002) 
describes the aim as the creation of an area without internal restrictions; an enhancement of 
an economic and monetary cohesion that would introduce in the long term the adoption of 
a single currency; the guarantee of free movement of people, with the adoption of 
appropriate action to control boundaries; asylum; immigration; prevention and fight against 
crime. 
Summarizing the arguments, the emergence of supranationalism in Europe has its 
very specific historical roots and there are two key factors that had made it possible. 
Firstly, the issue about the German rearmament was solved separately, West Germany 
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to which it had to oblige to 
incorporate all its forces and the Saar Treaty in 1955 ended the lasting rivalries between 
France and Germany. Second, there has been a combination of external threats and external 
support that favored the acceptance of a supranational agreement. France saw itself 
confronted with a decolonization process and the question about its international power 
and Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 favored an environment of deeper integration 
even if there was not a consensus about it (BEST, 2007). 
 
4.2. The case of Mercosur 
 
In the consequence of its historical, political and social structure, countries of Latin 
America have always faced some difficulties to growth economically and to establish 
public policies for the development of better opportunities for its citizens (GODOY, 2008). 
In the middle of those obstacles Mercosur arose after some crises due to 
authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Argentina (MALAMUD, 2003a) and in an international 
environment of great expansion in international trade (FONTES, 2000). Further, Mercosur 
can be seen as a result of a paradigm shift in the region as integration would help to 
stabilize democratic values and structures. At least, Mercosur can be seen as a southern 
alternative to free trade initiatives on behalf of the United States of America to protect 
itself from North American absorption (GRATIUS, 2001). 
With the Treaty of Assunção in 1991 the regional bloc of Mercosur has been 
founded and obtained in 1994 with the Protocol of Ouro Preto the status of legal 
personality of international law. The treaty of Assunção had the objective to create 
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mechanisms for an institution promoting free trade between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. Targets like the free circulation of the four factors of production as goods, 
services, financial and human capital, the elimination of barriers and the creation of an 
extern tariff, called tarifa externa comum (TEC). The Protocol of Ouro Preto transformed 
the Mercosur from a zone of free trade to a tariff union with a legal status in the 
international law (GODOY, 2008). Further, its governing bodies were consolidated and 
improved with institutions like the Council of the Common Market, Group of the Common 
Market, Commission of Trade in Mercosur, Parliamentary Commission, Socio-Economic 
Consular Tribunal and an Administrative Secretary of Mercosur (see TREATY OF OURO 
PRETO, 1994). This was an essential step for the integration project, as the Council 
obtained a representative function as it can now exercise legal personality of international 
law of Mercosur and: 
Negotiate and sign contracts in the name of Mercosur in third countries, 
country groups and international organizations. These functions can be 
delegated to the Group of Common Market by express order, to the 
stipulated conditions in paragraph VII of the article 14 (ARTICLE 8 




A deeper analysis of the treaty reveals that the member states did not pretended to 
attribute to it any supranational characteristics. This is evident in many parts of the treaty 
as in the description of the system of decision-making. Article 37 makes clear that the 
decisions made by the institutions have to happen by consensus and in the presence of all 
member states. 
Correspondent to Malamud (2003b) one can observe a strong role of governing 
actors of the member states in the integration process, principally because in every step 
forward in the integration process all executive national powers are very intensively 
involved (congruent with the presidential system argument in chapter 3.3.). 
Since its foundation Mercosur experienced an expansion of its dimension which has 
been initially limited to trade. Throughout the 90‟s these changes and new focuses occurred 
as new leaders as Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became Brazils President in 2003, Nestor 
Kirchner in Argentina in 2003, Tabaré Vasquez in Uruguay in 2005 and Fernando Lugo in 
Paraguay in 2008. The expansion of the objectives, without rejecting the free trade 
                                                 
7
 Treaty of Ouro Preto, 1994. http://www.antaq.gov.br/Portal/pdf/Mercosulprotocoloouropreto.pdf 
[29.11.2014] 
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dimension, with policies in social and productive domains created the so called new 
Mercosur (BRICEÑO-RUIZ, 2014). 
 
5. Supranationalism for Mercosur? 
 
This chapter is included in order to add additional knowledge and evidence to the 
theoretical approaches that have been discussed in the previous chapters. Best (1997) 
points to the importance of identifying governing needs and the governing capacities in 
order to understand the complexity of the implementation of the integration objectives.  
The analysis is limited to five key variables as they interrelate with the previous 
theoretical discussions and complete the discussion. 
 
Figure 1. Key variables of complexity in regional integration arrangements 
 Key variables Possible challenges 
1 Number of member states  
2 Relative size of the 
participating countries 
 
3 Degree of real 
interdependence 
Degree of complementary 
Intra group trade 
Degree of transnational interaction 
Importance of political ties 
Importance of military alliances 
4 Political framework Existence of common threat 
Awareness of individual 
international impotence 
Existence of historical perceptions 
of the relationships between the 
participating countries 
5 Perceptions, values, norms (Dis)similarity of perceptions of 
the nature, objectives and 
importance of the integration 
process 
Differences in constitutional 
systems 
Differences in political systems 
Attitude towards 
institutionalization 
Perception of a common (regional) 
identity 
(Dis)similarities in national value 
systems 
(Dis)similarities in social 
structures 
Source: Best (1997: 60-66), but own adaptation. 
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As the Brazilian site about Mercosur offers useful data for the analysis the 
comments are mostly based on these data. 
The Treaty of Assunção in 1991 has been signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay.
8
 In 2012 Mercosur experienced the first enlargement when Venezuela has 
been accepted as a full member state of Mercosur. In addition, Mercosur counts a few 
associated member states as Chile since 1996, Peru since 2003, Colombia and Ecuador 
since 2004, Guiana and Suriname since 2013. Bolivia belongs since 1994 to the associated 
member states and is currently in the process of admittance as a full member state. Actually 
one can talk about five member states. The number of the members is an important 
component for the institutional framework, respectively what decision rules are 
established. The more the members of the integration project the less power each member 
exerts, thus, leading to a diffusion of power. The Mercosur case is due its only five 
members in a distinct situation (LANE; MEALAND, 2000). To exemplify the difference: 
In 1999, Brazil was under external pressure and the authorities decided to devaluate the 
Brazilian Real which resulted in more competitive Brazilian exports and the perception of 
a threat across the Mercosur member states. Argentina‟s answer to the Brazilian action was 
the restriction on Brazilian imports which was against regional agreement. Against the 
advices of the Brazilian and Argentinian foreign ministers the president Menem and 
president Cardoso arranged a summit with an impressive positive outcome as Mercosur 
was considered dead at that moment (MALAMUD, 2003b). 
The Mercosur territory occupies 71.8% (12.789.558 km2) of the territory of South 
America and is about 3 times larger compared to the European Union. Whereas Brazil has 
the biggest territory of 8.502.728 km2, the second biggest territory has Argentina with 
2.791.810 km2. Venezuela has a territory of 912.050 km2, Paraguay of 406.750 km2 and at 
least Uruguay with 176.220 km2.
9
 Brazil is by far the largest member state with a 
population of almost 203 Million in 2014, Argentina with a population of 43 Million in 




These facts call attention to the high asymmetries between the countries. The 
asymmetries are not observed only on the territorial level and in relation to population size 
across the countries but also on the constitutional level. While Argentina, Paraguay and 
                                                 
8
 http://www.mercosul.gov.br/saiba-mais-sobre-o-mercosul [29.11.2014] 
9
 http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php [29.11.2014] 
10
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html [29.11.2014] 
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Venezuela treat international treaties and the “community law” of Mercosur as a law above 
the national law, the Brazilian and Uruguayan constitutional systems apply the principle of 
the supremacy of national law over international treaties. Due to these national 
constitutional characteristics the integration within Mercosur could not advance in the 
same way as in the European Union. These obstacles should not impede Mercosur to 
promote the social dimension as the countries are characterized by differences in economic 
and social asymmetries within the region (PUCHETA, 2014). 
Comparing data about the GDP in US$ in 2011 Mercosur positioned itself in 2011 
as the 5
th
 largest economy in the world. While the United States had a GDP (in US$ 
Millions) of 15.094.025, China had 7.298.147, Japan 5.869.471, Germany 3.577.031, 
Mercosur 3.324.501, France 2.776.324, Brazil 2.492.908, United Kingdom 2.417.570, Italy 









 Intra-exports (in US$ 
Millions) 2007 
Intra-exports (in US$ 
Millions)2011 
Argentina 13.629 22.577 
Brazil 22.078 32.444 
Paraguay 1.386 2.908 
Uruguay 1.353 2.726 
Venezuela 1.123 2.039 
Mercosur, total 39.569 62.694 
Source: Own figure. Data from the Mercosur website. 
 
The data coincide with Malamud‟s (2003b) reasoning and data for the timeframe 
1980-1996 that the interdependence was not a requirement for integration in the Mercosur 
case. To the contrary: integration steps were responsible for the increase in economic 
interdependence corresponding to the “new regional animal”, as described in chapter 3.3.  
Conforming to the Brazilian website of Mercosur the regional integration project 
performs as an agricultural power. Mercosur is the biggest global exporter of liquid sugar, 
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 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx [29.11.2014] 
12
 http://www.mercosul.gov.br/dados-gerais [29.11.2014] 
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the globally largest producer and exporter of soya, the largest producer and second largest 
global exporter of beef and global 4
th
 largest producer of wine.
13
 
In energetic terms, Mercosur represents one of the largest global energy powers 
with 19.60 % (in 2011) of the total reserves in the world and 3.1% of the total gas reserves 
in the world. 92.7% of all petroleum reserves of Mercosur come from Venezuela.
14
 
The 1990‟s were marked by a change of paradigm, based on the principals of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), where the 
governments of the member states lost their power in the regional economic integration 
due to the neoliberal alignment.
15
 This paradigm has been promoted by the government of 
Brazilian president Collor and the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the 
Mercosur market opened up to multinationals (MOTTA; MARTINS; DA SILVA; CULPI, 
2013).  
For the understanding of the integration process of the Mercosur it is necessary to 
include the foreign policy strategies of the Brazilian government (MOTTA; MARTINS; 
DA SILVA; CULPI, 2013). Under the government of former Brazilian president Lula, 
Mercosur has been declared as a priority of the government as well as the strengthening of 
the relations with the South American neighbor countries. Nevertheless, the main barriers 
in the process of the consolidation of a common market persisted (MEDEIROS; DRI, 
2013). In 2006 the discourse changed and the Brazilian government barely mentioned 
Mercosur (GARCIA, 2006). Instead of focusing of the regional integration process of 
Mercosur the priorities were set on the enhancement of the relations between Asia and 
Africa, what remained during the first years of Dilma‟s presidency. Lula‟s discourse about 
the development project and the aim to establish national prosperity connected to regional 
prosperity did not correspond to the economic data about the Brazilian trade with 
Mercosur. Brazil‟s success was based more on the individual participations in forums like 
the G-20 or the BRICS.
16
 This behavior highlights the well-known conflict between 
discourses in domestic and foreign policy (MEDEIROS; DRI, 2013) and does not permit to 
detect a continuance in norms and preferences. Silva (1989) argues that the 
democratization process in Sarney‟s Brazil lead to a politicization of the foreign ministry. 
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 http://www.mercosul.gov.br/dados-gerais [29.11.2014] 
14
 Source: International Energy Outlook EIA/DOE/USA, 2011, Oil&Gas Journal –World Energy Outlook – 
IEA 
15
 CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
16
 G-20: Summit of the twenty major industrialized and emerging countries. BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa 
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The Brazilian example gives evidence to the strong leading executive power of the South 
American presidentialism, better defined as a “centralized decision-making arrangement” 
(CHEIBUB; LIMONGI, 2000) or “presidential protagonism” (MALAMUD, 2003b, p. 66). 
The national institutional framework of the South American region impacts as discussed in 
the theoretical part the identity and institutional nature of the integration project. The 
minimal and flexible institutionalization on national level is reflected on the regional level 
(MALAMUD, 2003b). 
Regarding the leadership question there is still an unresolved discussion on Brazil 
and its commitment to play the role of a leader (BRICEÑO-RUIZ, 2014). Camargo (2006) 
argues that there is a need of a reduction of the asymmetries between the member states 
that should be paid by Argentina and Brazil. The conceptualization of Mercosur without 
Argentina and Brazil is inconceivable especially because the regional arrangement of 
Mercosur constructs a new alliance between these two countries. 
Even if not fully comparable there exist some parallels between the historical 
Brazilian-Argentinian distrust and the historical rivalries between France and Germany. 
Since the 19
th
 century both Brazil and Argentina tried to establish relationships with 
hegemonic United States and United Kingdom. For decades there has been a dominance of 
militarism within both countries policies that contributed to the environment of distrust. 
Similarly as the foundation of the European Community served for a peaceful environment 
between France and Germany, Mercosur fulfills the purpose to vanquish the distrust 
between Brazil and Argentina. Even the agenda of those two regional arrangements seem 
to have similarities as its aims include economic, political, social and productive objectives 
(BRICEÑO-RUIZ, 2014). Nevertheless, as already mentioned in the former chapters, the 
institutional framework of Mercosur has not been influenced by the Europeans Union‟s 
institutional model. In no way the Mercosur model seems to be an approximation to the 
supranational model (BRICEÑO-RUIZ, 2014). 
Since 2003 Mercosur has changed and broadened the integration focus to social and 
productive areas. Notwithstanding the changes in institutional terms with for example of 
the Protocol of Olivos for the solution of controversial issues (creation of a Permanent 
Tribunal for interpretation of normative questions) and the approval of the Social Action 
Plan in 2011 Mercosur cannot be described in its present shape as promoting a regional 
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social policy. (BRICEÑO-RUIZ, 2014).
17
 Pucheta (2014) argues that a major reform is 
necessary in order to be able to deal with social issues, as the construction of regional 
markets is connected to challenges. Numerous conflicts might arise when people interact 
and are displaced across different regions. Even when there is not yet free movement of 
workers in Mercosur an agreement of free residence has been established. This new 
dimension has its roots both on national and regional level. On regional level has been 
established an Economic-Social Consultative Forum with the role to influence the social 
dimension of Mercosur. The forum issues non-binding recommendations for member states 
upon their request or of its own initiative. The Council of the Common Market gives space 
to initiatives related to the labor dimension and where ministers give recommendations 
about the incorporation of some rights, as unemployment benefits and the protection of 
wages. As Mercosur lacks of reliable statistical data the Labor Market Observatory has 
been founded to promote production, collection and analysis with regard to employment, 
labor migration and social security for example. Even if these advancements are on the 
basis of recommendations, they show a certain amplification of the regional integration 
dimension. And moreover, one has to be aware that Mercosur is a relatively new regional 
integration project and for its short time of its existence improvements in the social 
dimension have to be seen positively from institutional and normative perspective 
(PUCHETA, 2014). 
It may be theoretically reasonable to conclude from these amplified integration 
objectives and the analyzed institutional challenges that a (partly) supranational framework 
could be the first step in a deeper integration process of Mercosur and a possible solution 
for its internal struggles about a common agenda setting. 
The problem about this conclusion is that it does not consider the effective 
applicability of a supranational structure. In practical terms the decision of a (partly) 
supranational structural needs a persistent commitment and shared values and the 
effectiveness of a supranational union have to rest upon a strong acceptance and 
willingness of implementation by national players. Formal supranational structures have to 
be built upon the contextual reality and upon real aspects (BEST, 2005) as the perceptions, 
values and norms in Latin American countries. 
Intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary action may in fact be more 
appropriate and more effective for some areas of common concern. And 
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in all cases, the creation of transnational associations and inter-societal 
ties is the key to success of regional integration in the long term (BEST, 
2005, p. 45). 
 
In the context of institutional framework the integration in Latin America Legler 
(2013) argues that the defense of national sovereignty had a long tradition in Latin America 
protecting the countries from foreign invasions and interventions from the Europeans and 
the United States. It may create the impression that the sovereignty concept is a static 
concept in the region. Indeed the sovereignty has undergone some modifications as 
described by Legler (2013). The social construction of sovereignty in Latin America has 
been linked to traditions to protect domestic human rights and democracy (SIKKINK, 
1996). As explained in the chapter about sovereignty it may be questioned if the sovereign 
is always the state, because who the sovereign is may be linked to values about political 
participation of the citizens. President Hugo Chávez had made frequent statements that the 
people in Venezuela were sovereign, even if we see nowadays that it is more a theoretical 
rhetoric than a practice. In respect of the territory the European supranationalism gave 
space to new possibilities in terms of sovereign space. Further, Lake (2010) argues that the 
authority component of sovereignty does not have to be state centric. The authority does 
not have to be concentrated only on governmental players. 
Dabène (2012) verifies a trend of integration à la carte where each country 
endorses its level of commitment to integration arrangements. And Brazil as by far the 
biggest member state of Mercosur and the least dependent economy on Mercosur 
(MEDEIROS; DRI, 2013) engages in instrumental regionalism, in arrangements as 
Mercosur for extra-regional and global ambitions. By acting for its own benefit the positive 
results of the internal Brazilian reforms increased the power asymmetries among Mercosur 
countries. In 2009 Mercosur was responsible for only 10.3% of Brazilian trade whereas 
there was a high trade rate between Germany and the European Union (60.59%)
1819
. 
Brazils distance to Mercosur is the result of an instrumental rationality that defines the 
nation-state as the central factor in international relations (MEDEIROS; DRI, 2013). In 
2000 when the discussions regarding the Tree Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) with 
Mercosur started, they were accompanied by social movements opposing the relations 
between the United States and Latin America (FREE TRADE AREA OF THE 
                                                 
18
 External and intra-European Union trade Montly statistics, issue number 10/2009. 
19
 Balança Comercial Brasileira: dados consolidados, Secretaria de Comércio Exterior do Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, 2009. 
Marketa Maria Jerabek  424 
BJIR, Marília, v. 5, n. 2, p., mai/ago. 2016 
AMERICAS, 2015). To counterbalance the FTAA the Brazilian government tried to 
rebuild a good relationship with Argentina. The historical rivalry between Brazil and 
Argentina was provoked by negative reactions from one country or the other about 
macroeconomic policies or international politics. In 1999 Argentinean industries suffered 
by the devaluation of the Brazilian currency and Brazil‟s financial market has been badly 
affected by the Argentinean crisis in 2001. In 2004 was planned an approval of institutional 
changes in Mercosur as the installation of the Parliament but the reforms did not happened 
due to commercial conflicts between Argentina and Brazil (DABÈNE, 2009). 
The constant rivalry inhibit any solution towards a deeper integration process 
because there is missing a common base and common values to establish further 
institutional arrangements which demand from both parties (actually from all member 
states) credible commitment. Diplomats stressed the uselessness of the adaption of the 
European supranational integration model arguing that Latin America did not confront the 
problem of entering into war with its neighbors. There is a clear alienation of the adaption 
of a model that requires ceding some national sovereignty (MEDEIROS; DRI, 2013). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
An institutional framework towards supranationalism, or at least partly, could help 
to reduce transaction costs between the member states, create a mutual confidence as 
smaller states would have more equal chances to be taken into account and could enhance 
policy credibility towards national governments, third parties, markets and citizens. On the 
normative level can be identified dissimilarities between the state members as Brazil has 
not a stable proximity to the integration process and as the common thread between Brazil 
and Argentina concerning the integration process rests on an unsound footing. Without a 
credible commitment towards common norms, rules, institutions in general, from all 
members, especially Brazil as a strong power in Mercosur, the idea about supranationalism 
does not seem to be appropriate. 
Kahler and Lake (2009) verify that the supranational framework in Europe seems to 
be a case of sui generis without application to other regions. An absence of supranational 
authority does not mean that governance cannot occur beyond country governments. 
Maybe it is on the time to reject the assumption that supranationalism is the only 
alternative to national forms of governance. There might exist other governance forms that 
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expand authority through the power of hegemons or there might be some combinations of 
interstate and transnational players. An effective governance and cooperation beyond the 
state level might occur also without a supranational structure (KAHLER; LAKE, 2009). 
The challenge for Mercosur is composed of the merge between the internal and 
external agendas of the regional bloc to get the functioning of the integration to work and 
to define the integration targets embedded in the political dynamics between its members 
(VAZ, 2001). 
 
7. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
The strongest critics can be made in relation to the comparison and application of 
the European supranational experience on other regional integration projects. On one side 
this method is useful as the European integration has a very long history and therefore has 
achieved certain credibility among scholars who do research on comparative regional 
integration. On the other side, as has been concluded, Mercosur has a different history and 
institutional framework. Future research should be open to analyze what kind of 
governance structures (some modifications of intergovernmentalism?) could arise in Latin 
America, especially in Mercosur, as the defense of sovereignty has a long tradition in Latin 
America and supranationalism does not seem to be the solution; at least not in today‟s 
development stage. 
There may be other governance structures based on the sovereignty trends in the 
region. “Latin American scholars therefore need to move beyond describing trends and 
patterns in regional politics and sovereignty to theorizing much more why and how they 
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